The Difference between Determinism and Fatalism

The Difference between “Determinism” and “Fatalism”: The terms “determinism” and “fatalism” are often used confusedly, as if they were synonyms, or as if one term or the other exhausted all possibilities, leaving the other term essentially vacuous. In this micro-essay I hope to give a reasonably clear explanation of the distinction between the meanings of these terms – (Determinism Fatalism)

This exposition is not meant to imply that I do or do not endorse any of the philosophical or psychological claims that will be herein asserted.

Both “determinism” and “fatalism” occur most frequently in metaphysical discussions of “free-will”; both determinism [hereafter D] and fatalism [hereafter F] are usually considered to be inconsistent with “free-will” [hereafter FW], such that, if either or both D or F are true (they are not mutually inconsistent), then FW – considered as a concept or doctrine – is false.

It will therefore be necessary to say a little about the concept or doctrine of FW. FW consists of the claim that human subjects [hereafter S] are capable of causing events in the world, including voluntary movements of their own bodies, in such a way that the contribution made by S is a necessary condition for the occurrence of some action or event; i.e., without S’s contribution, that action or event [hereafter E] could not have occurred. Now, at one level, this claim is trivially true. My coffee cup cannot be raised to my lips if I am not here.

Tracing the Origin of Sarcasm

However, advocates of FW mean more than this; they mean to assert that S is not merely present as one among many material causes of an event, they mean that S is THE cause of the event. What, exactly, is this assertion meant to imply? Here the question becomes a bit sticky and open to multiple interpretations. One unproblematic interpretation of FW is legalistic or circumstantial; i.e., S is “free” as long as S is not restrained, imprisoned, coerced, etc.

This legalistic interpretation is primarily confined to the legal system. Most discussions of FW jump almost immediately to the metaphysical. At this level, it appears that any action taken by S is not free as long as it is caused by anything but S

. This singular causal power is typically referred to as “the will,” hence the term “free will.” But what is the “will”? To see why we should be wary of this term, examine the development of German Idealism. With thinkers like Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Marx, etc., the “will” is elevated (as was “Reason” before it) almost to the level of the divine. Such usage is a bit too florid for my purposes, so I shall speak of “will” simply as the “faculty of volition.” Exercise of the faculty of volition is a necessary precondition for an act to be voluntary, and only voluntary actions are free (accidental actions cannot be “free” in this sense).

What’s Wrong with Conspiracy Theories

Speaking at this metaphysical level, it seems that a necessary precondition for S’s will to be free is that S’s will – or its volitions – are themselves necessary conditions for the occurrence of E, but the necessary conditions for the volitions themselves are effectively null.

In other words, the exercise of FW must be caused by nothing but S, because if the will is subject to natural causal influences external to S, then the will, in some important sense, is not free. On its face, this claim is absurd.

The causes of S’s volitions must be manifold; for example, if S is deprived of oxygen for a length of time, it is doubtful that S’s FW will be functional. But this is not what advocates of FW mean; they mean that there is something about S (the will) which is subject to absolutely no condition, natural or otherwise, save S’s choices or decisions, and this “will” is sufficient to bring about E.

As strange as this claim may seem, it does have its uses. That, however, is not my present concern. My concern is to clarify the meanings of “determinism” and “fatalism.” Both D and F are theoretical stances from which all of the above claims made for FW would be regarded as gobbledygook, but, FW would be gobbledygook for different reasons depending on whether that theoretical stance is D or F.

These stances differ, in effect, by the directions in time toward which they cast their analytic gazes. D is essentially backward-looking; D concerns the actual, physical, measurable causes of E. Advocates of D maintain that once we have exhaustively accounted for all the natural causes of E, then we have exhausted all the causes of D.

Discussing the 5 Predominant Theories of Truth

There is nothing left over for this mysterious FW to do, as it were, out of nothingness. There are no uncaused causes. D is an empirical hypothesis which, someday, may actually become a testable theory. F is essentially forward-looking; F concerns the reality of future alternative courses of action.

For example, if I am confronted with a fork in the path, I must choose. According to D, my choice is wholly determined by the sum of all efficacious past causes. But according to F, my choice is limited by the number of alternative paths that are really, not apparently, available. What if the appearance of alternatives is illusory? What if the story is already written?

Put differently, F arises from pondering whether counterfactual possibilities could have been realized. I got out of bed at 7 this morning. Could I have slept in instead? Problems arise because, if I had slept in, the result would have been an entirely different world – one in which I slept late.

How do we know that, at any given moment, we could do anything any differently than what we actually do? We can’t go into the past and do it differently. F arises from taking these problems seriously, and, with perhaps a dash of pessimism, concluding that (barring time travel) there is absolutely no way that we could know that we are capable of doing anything – including whatever we are doing at this present moment – in any other way that the way it does, in fact, occur.

The Difference between Evidence and Proof

Fatalism is rather like the characters in a novel becoming conscious, and realizing that they can’t do anything about the way the novel ends. Both D and F, in so far as they are philosophically interesting, are counterpoints against FW. D criticizes FW from the past, maintaining that there are no causes but natural causes, and no natural cause is free. F criticizes FW from the future, maintaining that no apparent alternative, no apparent choice, could come out in any way other than the way it comes out, and hence there is nothing “free” about the outcome.

Think of Oedipus attempting to flee fate. Unlike D, which does have the potential to become a testable empirical theory – after our understanding of brain function has advanced considerably – F is thoroughly metaphysical and untestable.

There is no way to travel into the past and do something differently. I can’t go back to this morning and choose to sleep late. Since there is apparently no way to do anything differently than the way we actually do it, F seems both metaphysical and patently obvious.

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