NB: Epistemic Relativism or Factual Relativism

Relativism is supposed to be a philosophical theory of truth, and, as such, it must explain what it means for a proposition to be true, or else relativism fails as a theory of truth.

Philosophical and scientific theories are expected to be general; that is to say, a theory of truth should account for all instances of truth in general, or, if it cannot, it should give us a principled explanation for those exceptions which do not fall under the general theory.

What is the ‘relativist theory of truth’?

When we ask the relativist what truth is, we are likely to get an answer like this:

Statement 1: is true relative to a person or system S just in case S believes p.
(To say that a “system” S believes p is presumably to assume that minds or cultures are systems of some sort, but we need not explore this claim.)

Now the problem here is that statement 1 is true or false, and the relativist clearly believes that it is true. We are therefore within our rights to ask why it is true. In other words, what makes statement 1 true? There are two ways that the relativist can answer this question: Either statement 1 is relatively or non-relatively true. If statement 1 is relatively true, then it is true only because S believes it. So we can get the following statement.

Statement 2: S believes that ‘ is true relative to a person or system S just in case S believes ‘.
Of course, statement 2 is also a statement, and it is also true or false. We are again within our rights to ask why it is true, and again it must be relatively or non-relatively true. As before, if statement 2 is relatively true, then it is true only because S believes it, and we get another statement: Statement 3: S believes that “S believes that ‘ is true relative to a person or system S just in case S believes ‘.”

Statement 3 is also a statement, and it is also true or false. If it is true we are allowed to ask why it is true, and again, it is either relatively or non-relatively true. If the relativist asserts that statement #3 is relatively true, then it is true only because S believes it, and this yields statement 4 about which we can ask the same question, and so on.

Ultimately we will need a statement 5, 6, 7 ad infinitum. This kind of development is called an “infinite regress,” and it is considered logically absurd.

The truth of statement 1 cannot depend on its being embedded in infinitely regressive levels of belief, because we are finite creatures presumably incapable of entertaining infinite levels of belief. If truth cannot depend on an infinitely regressive series of beliefs, then the regress must end somewhere, presumably with a non-relative truth

. So it would appear that at least some truths are not relative.

Now, in and of itself, the admission that some truths are non-relative does not render the relativist’s position inconsistent. Most general theories admit of exceptions, but, the theory must be able to account for these exceptions in a manner consistent with the basic tenets of the general theory. How is relativism to do this? How does the relativist draw a principled line between relative and non-relative truths?
Suppose that the relativist, having been confronted by the regress problem, accepts statement 1 as a non-relative truth.

Counterfactual Truth – Truths That Are Contrary To Fact

If statement #1 is non-relatively true, then statement 1 is true because it asserts something about the world, something about what we might call “the way the world is.” But why, in this one case, is a statement made true by the way the world is? Why not in other cases as well? How can relativism explain the non-relative truth of statement 1 in a manner consistent with its own theory, and exclusive of other non-relative truths? To my knowledge these questions have never been adequately answered, and I do not believe that they can be adequately answered.

Moreover, note the following implications of the relativist’s admission of this single exception: 1) There are things that are the case; that is, there is a world, and there is some particular way that the world is. To wit, the world contains a person or system S, it contains the proposition, and it contains a relation of belief between S and. 2) Statement 1 is true not because anyone believes it, but because it captures or “corresponds to” this particular way that the world is.

Hence, the truth of relativism would appear to be erected on conditions which logically require its own falsity, surely a sign of logical incoherence.

See The Difference between Determinism and Fatalism

I do not know how the relativist can consistently meet the challenge presented by the regress problem, and, if the relativist cannot consistently meet this challenge, then the implication is that relativism is inconsistent as a theory of truth. For most people, this is enough to refute relativism…, but usually not for the relativist.