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A micro-essay on why Utilitarianism fails as a moral theory :
Peter Singer, a well-known contemporary philosopher specializing in moral and ethical theory, has argued that “distance” (meaning actual distance or remoteness in space) does not matter in ethical concerns. In other words, we should be just as concerned about someone who is starving thousands of miles away as we are about homeless people in our own city, or our neighbor whose house has just burned down.
Singer is a self-proclaimed and devout Utilitarian; in fact, in contemporary discussions of Utilitarian theory, Singer is often considered the standard-bearer for this school of thought. Utilitarianism (which originates with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill), is the belief that the morality (goodness or badness) of any action should be judged solely on the consequences of that action: actions which produce good consequences are good actions, actions which produce bad consequences are bad actions.
The difference between Utilitarianism and Egoism is that Egoism is concerned only with the goodness or badness of actions as they affect me (the Ego), whereas Utilitarianism is radically democratic, and believes that the morality of an action should be gauged on how it affects the majority of those people who are, in fact, affected by that action. For the Utilitarian (as opposed to the Egoist), my own benefit or suffering counts no more or less than the next guy’s. And, according to Singer, it doesn’t matter if “the next guy” lives next door, or ten thousand miles away.
I believe that Singer’s views (and Utilitarianism in general) are radically flawed. While I agree that Utilitarianism may be the best theory we’ve got in matters of public policy – such as legislated and common law – it does not follow that “the best we’ve got” is perfect, or even especially reliable. In what follows I will list, first, the problems that I see in Utilitarianism in general, ending with the problems I see in Singer’s view on the “reach” of our moral concern or consideration.
1. Quaestio accidente: As Utilitarianism is formulated by all of its major proponents, the moral weight of an action should be measured solely on its consequences and – as opposed to, say, the position advocated by Kant – never on its antecedents (ante factum or “before the fact” considerations).
However, if we take this position on its face, then there is no longer any such thing as an accident. If Cheryl hits Sam with her car and Sam dies, the act is bad or evil, regardless of whether it was intentional or accidental. There is no way to discriminate accidents from intentional actions without taking “intentions” into consideration, and intentions occur before the fact.
2. Quaestio non praevisa (The principle of unforeseen consequences): Utilitarianism, like any form of consequentialism, requires a bit of fortune-telling from the agent when trying to determine what actions to take – one wants to take the action which will have the best possible consequences.
But since the consequences lie in the future, one can only guess or predict on the basis of probability what is likely to happen. But what if things go wrong, and horrible consequences result? Is the agent let off the hook because he/she could not have been expected to predict the unforeseen consequence?
Note that this prediction occurred before the fact, and so here again the Utilitarian is forced to appeal to “ante factum” considerations when making a moral judgment. It begins to look like consequentialism is not merely mistaken, it is impossible.
3. The naturalistic fallacy: David Hume and G.E. Moore both give versions of the naturalistic fallacy, but I believe they can be analyzed into a common denominator. Hume argues that we can never, “by any operation of reason,” determine what ought to be (ethics) from what is (nature). This is often known as the “is/ought” distinction.
As an example, science – a naturalistic study – might inform us that there are 60,000,000 starving children in the world, but there is no empirical or mathematical operation that we can perform on that number in order to derive the number of starving children that there ought to or should be in the world. If we agree that there should be 0 starving children, Hume would ask us how we arrived at that number, and if we appeal to moral values, he would point out that moral values do not occur in nature.
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3a. The naturalistic fallacy again: G.E. Moore argues that whatever it is that we mean by “the good,” it cannot be a natural property such as “pleasure” because, given any such property, it is always possible to ask “Why is it good?” If we attempt to answer this (series of) questions with another – and another and another – naturalistic property, we end up with an infinite regress.
According to Moore, “good” is a simple, un-analyzable property which cannot be strictly defined or described. Although this ineffability of “goodness” might seem strange, it is actually no more unusual than our inability to describe the color “green” to someone blind from birth, or our inability to describe the difference between pitch and tone to a deaf person. The common denominator which these two versions of the “naturalistic fallacy” share is that goodness (especially moral goodness) is not a natural property.
4. Regressus infinitum: Much Utilitarian argument involves the logical absurdity that what is here-and-now never has any value in itself, but is only to be judged by its consequences; which again, when they are realized, would have no value in themselves but would be mere means to a still further future, an so on ad infinitum [paraphrased from G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1956, p. 106].
5. Quaestio prohibere: Utilitarianism contains no intrinsic means of determining the extent to which our obligations are limited. If we take the Utilitarian imperative on its face, then we are obliged to give until we have virtually given ourselves into poverty, taking the place of the needy whom we have previously serviced.
Singer himself is a perfect example of this when he says (arbitrarily, with no Utilitarian justification) that our giving should be limited only by what is necessary to meet our own fundamental needs. However, many of us already live on the edge of poverty and, by Utilitarian standards, are incapable of doing good, or, at any rate, incapable of doing as much good as might be achieved by the wealthy. The implication here is that the wealthy are at least capable of being better people than the poor, and I find such a claim inherently objectionable.
6. Quaestio spatium: Singer argues that our moral obligations to people in remote locations is equal to who are close, such as our loved ones, our friends, and our neighbors. I think this claim is false because it violates another moral principle developed by Hume: “Ought implies can.” In other words, I am morally obligated to do only what it is possible for me to do; I have no obligation to do the impossible.
If someone is starving ten thousand miles away from me, there is little I can do besides give money (which I may not have) to a charitable organization, which I may not trust. Unfortunately (depending on the charitable organization), it is typically only a small percentage of what is given that actually reaches the needy people.
However, I can extend personal support to those near me. If my neighbor’s house has burned down, I can give shelter to the family. If my cousin has a broken leg, I can mow his lawn for him. It is my claim that our moral obligations to those nearest to us do, in fact, exceed our obligations to those more distant for two reasons: a) It is practically possible for me to benefit those near me far more than I can benefit those at great distance; and b) Emotion, not reason, is the primary motivating factor in all moral action, and I am far more likely to care for those near me than those who are remote.
In closing, I believe I have given five good arguments for the inadequacy of Utilitarianism as a moral theory, except at the level of public policy, where – as often seems to be the case – we are stuck with the lesser of evils. In my own case, I believe that morality can be more adequately accounted for through a theory which I call “critically rational intuitionism,” which allows a role for both reason and emotion in making moral decisions.
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